Critical Infrastructure & Energy
Securing the critical infrastructure sector
Power utilities, oil & gas and industrial operators run OT and SCADA estates where an intrusion has physical, safety-critical consequences, and the regulatory load is just as heavy: IEC 62443, CEA cyber-security guidelines for the power sector, NCIIPC requirements for protected systems and the CERT-In Directions 2022.
We assess and harden these environments without interrupting operations, with energy-sector engagements spanning Petronet LNG, Numaligarh Refinery, Gujarat Gas and Adani.
- IEC 62443 zones, conduits & security levels
- CEA Cyber Security Guidelines (power sector)
- NCIIPC / CII protected-system obligations
- ISO 27001 / 22301 operational resilience
Key challenges we solve
OT/SCADA & ICS security (IEC 62443)
CEA / power-sector cyber-security audits
Safe testing of safety-critical systems
Segmentation & operational resilience
Services for Critical Infrastructure & Energy
The capabilities most relevant to your sector. Each links to full details.
Specialised & Technical Consulting
IEC 62443-aligned OT architecture reviews and ICS risk assessments.
View service →Audit, Governance & Compliance
CEA guideline audits and NCIIPC-oriented compliance for protected systems.
View service →VAPT & Offensive Security
Passive-first testing of SCADA, PLCs and engineering workstations.
View service →Security Engineering & Incident Response
IT/OT segmentation design and OT incident-response playbooks.
View service →Managed Security & SOC
OT-aware monitoring that spots anomalies without touching control loops.
View service →Critical infrastructure questions
Experts commenting on the May 2025 attack on Central Coalfields Limited, a Coal India subsidiary, argued that attackers are shifting from grids and SCADA toward upstream fuel supply: mining operations, rail logistics, dispatch, ERP and billing, and inventory systems. Their concern is that thermal plants hold only a few days of coal, so a long disruption upstream could force shutdowns. This is expert opinion rather than confirmed attribution, but it is a useful prompt to include fuel and logistics systems in your threat model.
The guidelines from October 2021 require each responsible entity to appoint a CISO who heads an Information Security Division, and to buy ICT-based systems from trusted sources and trusted products. Products from other sources have to be tested for malware and hardware trojans before use in the supply network. Suspected or confirmed sabotage disturbances are reported to the sectoral CERT and CERT-In within 24 hours. A meter or SCADA rollout is therefore a security procurement exercise as much as an engineering one.
In the places where operational systems meet networks you do not fully control: meter head-end and communication systems, remote terminal units, vendor maintenance links, and the IT-side servers that feed SCADA. Because meter rollouts are large procurements of ICT equipment, the CEA trusted-source and pre-deployment testing requirement is directly relevant. We review the architecture and test the IT-facing components, and carry out OT-side testing in a lab or in agreed windows so that supply is never put at risk.
By choosing the method to fit the system. Passive network analysis and configuration review carry almost no risk. Active testing goes to a replica or lab setup, or to approved maintenance windows with operators present and rollback ready. We separate the IT side, where conventional testing is safe, from the control side, where nothing is touched without the plant's sign-off. The aim is to find segmentation gaps, exposed remote access and unsafe vendor connections before an attacker does.
CERT-In and NCIIPC safeguard critical sectors, and sector-specific teams extend that reach: CSIRT-Power works as an extended arm of CERT-In for the power sector, and CSIRT-Fin does so for finance. CERT-In's 2025 figures show most of its audits were in banking and financial institutions, power and energy, and transport, and its drills included power and oil and gas. Operators gain by joining these exercises, because response speed depends on contacts and procedures that have already been rehearsed.
That is a designation question, and the answer is not always obvious. Experts note that systems such as national load dispatch are covered under Section 70 of the IT Act, while fuel supply systems at coal subsidiaries often sit outside the designation, which they see as a gap. If you are unsure, ask your regulator or NCIIPC, and meanwhile apply the same discipline regardless: annual audit by an empanelled auditor, a tested crisis plan and a clear asset inventory of IT and OT systems.