VIRTUAL CAIM   SAMPLE REPORT - fictional engagement, sanitized
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VIRTUAL CAIM
Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing

Web, API and Network
Security Assessment Report

Prepared for Example Finserv Ltd. (fictional client). Customer portal, mobile API, partner gateway and back-office console.
SAMPLE REPORT - fictional engagement, sanitized
Report ID
VC-SAMPLE-VAPT-2026-001
Client
Example Finserv Ltd. (fictional NBFC)
Engagement window
14 September 2026 to 9 October 2026
Report date / version
21 October 2026 / v1.0 (Final)
Classification
Confidential (sample). Fictional data throughout.
Prepared by
Virtual Caim Private Limited. This Organization is empanelled by CERT-In for providing information Security Auditing Service.

Document control

Document title
VAPT Report: Customer Portal, Mobile API, Partner Gateway, Back-office Console
Document ID
VC-SAMPLE-VAPT-2026-001
Client point of contact
Head of Information Security, Example Finserv Ltd. (fictional)
Distribution
Named Point of Contact only. Shared through an encrypted, password-protected channel from an official Virtual Caim mailbox, with the password sent by a separate channel.
Handling
Working notes, raw tool output and screenshots are retained under the client's data-handling agreement and destroyed on the agreed date.

Version history

VersionDateStatusDescription
0.19 Oct 2026DraftInterim notification of Critical and High findings issued to the Point of Contact during testing.
0.914 Oct 2026DraftFull draft for factual accuracy review by the client.
1.021 Oct 2026FinalIssued after factual review. Re-test scheduled after remediation.

Tested artefacts

AssetEnvironment testedVersion / buildBuild hash (SHA-256)
Customer Web PortalUAT, production-equivalent4.12.39f3a...c71e (shortened)
Mobile APIUAT, production-equivalent2.8.041bd...07aa (shortened)
DSA PortalUAT1.9.4c0e2...5d19 (shortened)
Back-office consoleUAT (internal)3.3.17a58...e2f0 (shortened)
Partner gatewayProduction (external, non-intrusive checks only)n/an/a

Contents

  1. 1. Executive summary3
  2. 2. Scope and rules of engagement4
  3. 3. Methodology6
  4. 4. Findings summary8
  5. 5. Detailed findings9
  6. 6. Informational observations19
  7. 7. Risk matrix20
  8. 8. Remediation roadmap21
  9. 9. Re-test and closure policy22
  10. Annex A. Compliance mapping23
  11. Annex B. Test coverage and evidence register25
  12. Annex C. Glossary26
  13. Annex D. Sign-off26

1. Executive summary

Example Finserv Ltd. asked Virtual Caim to test its customer-facing lending platform and the supporting back-office console before the next product release. This summary is written for the Board, the CEO and the Chief Information Security Officer. It describes the risk in business terms. Technical detail is in section 5.

9
Findings
plus 3 informational observations
1
Critical
needs action within 7 days
3
High
needs action within 15 days
5
Medium and Low
planned release cycle

Overall risk posture

Rating: ELEVATED (sample)The platform has a solid technical base: modern transport security on the main hosts, input validation that stops common injection, and a WAF in front of the portal. The weak spots sit in the identity and authorisation layer, where a small number of design flaws can expose customer accounts and personal data at scale. We recommend that the release is held until the Critical finding (F-01) is closed and the High findings have a dated fix plan.

What the main findings mean for the business

What is working well

Where we recommend you start

PriorityActionFindingsOwner (suggested)Target
1Replace reset-token design and add throttlingF-01, F-03Application engineering lead7 to 15 days
2Introduce a central ownership check for API object accessF-02API team15 days
3Encode output in the console, add CSPF-04Back-office team15 days
4Session lifecycle, library, TLS and header hygieneF-05 to F-09Platform and DevOps30 to 90 days
5Add authorisation tests and SCA to the pipelineRoot causeEngineering and securityNext quarter

2. Scope and rules of engagement

2.1 Objectives

2.2 Assets in scope

#AssetTypeLocation (sanitized)EnvironmentDepth
1Customer Web PortalWeb applicationportal.examplefinserv.exampleUATAuthenticated, 2 customer roles
2Mobile API (Android and iOS back end)REST APIapi.examplefinserv.exampleUATAuthenticated, 340 documented routes
3DSA (agent) PortalWeb applicationdsa.examplefinserv.exampleUATAuthenticated, agent role
4Back-office consoleWeb application (internal)10.20.x.x (redacted)UATAuthenticated, officer role
5Partner gateway and perimeterExternal network203.0.113.0/28 (redacted)ProductionNon-intrusive, no exploitation

2.3 Out of scope

2.4 Timeline and effort

PhaseDatesEffort
Kick-off, access verification, test accounts14 to 15 Sep 20262 person-days
Reconnaissance and mapping16 to 18 Sep 20265 person-days
Vulnerability discovery and exploitation (safe)21 Sep to 2 Oct 202620 person-days
Post-exploitation analysis and impact validation5 to 7 Oct 20265 person-days
Reporting and walkthrough8 to 21 Oct 20264 person-days

2.5 Rules of engagement

2.6 Assumptions, limitations and constraints

2.7 Assessment team

RoleCountResponsibility
Lead Auditor1Planning, quality of testing, sign-off of findings
Security testers3Manual testing, tooling, evidence
Independent reviewer1Reviews the report. Not part of the test team.

3. Methodology

We follow a four-phase approach that moves from understanding the system to proving realistic impact and then to reporting. It is aligned with the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES), NIST SP 800-115 (technical guide to information security testing) and the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide (WSTG v4.2) with the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) as the benchmark for authentication, session and access control requirements. API testing follows the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023).

PhaseWhat we doTypical outputPTES stage
1. ReconnaissanceMap the attack surface: hosts, routes, technologies, user roles, trust boundaries. Review documentation and API specifications. Passive and low-impact active discovery.Asset and route inventory, role matrix, threat model notesPre-engagement, intelligence gathering, threat modelling
2. Vulnerability discoveryManual testing guided by WSTG categories, supported by scanners for breadth. Authenticated and unauthenticated passes. Business logic walk-throughs per role.Candidate issues with reproduction stepsVulnerability analysis
3. Exploitation and post-exploitationConfirm issues safely. Chain findings where it shows real impact. Assess what an attacker could reach and what could be proved with test data. No destructive actions.Validated findings, attack paths, impact statementsExploitation, post-exploitation
4. Reporting and walkthroughRate, de-duplicate, write evidence and fixes. Walk the client team through the findings, agree closure timelines, plan re-test.This report, evidence annex, walkthroughReporting

3.1 Test categories applied (OWASP WSTG v4.2)

WSTG areaExample checks performed
4.1 Information gatheringFingerprinting, entry points, application mapping, technology stack
4.2 Configuration and deploymentPlatform configuration, HTTP methods, HSTS, file extensions, backup files
4.3 Identity managementRole definitions, registration, account enumeration
4.4 AuthenticationCredential transport, lock-out, password reset, OTP, alternative channels
4.5 AuthorisationPath traversal, authorisation bypass, privilege escalation, object references
4.6 Session managementCookie attributes, fixation, CSRF, logout, timeout
4.7 Input validationReflected and stored XSS, injection classes, file inclusion
4.8 Error handlingError codes and stack traces
4.9 Weak cryptographyTLS configuration, padding, sensitive data over unencrypted channels
4.10 Business logicWorkflow integrity, request forging, upload of unexpected file types
4.11 Client sideDOM issues, clickjacking, CORS, web storage
4.12 API testingGraphQL not applicable; REST routes tested per OWASP API Top 10

3.2 Tools and manual techniques

Intercepting proxy (Burp Suite Professional), network and service discovery (Nmap), TLS analysis (testssl.sh), content discovery, and custom scripts written for this engagement. Automated results were never reported without manual validation. Tools were authorised in advance in the engagement plan shared with the client.

3.3 Severity and prioritisation model

Every finding carries a CVSS v3.1 base score and vector, an EPSS probability for the likelihood of real-world exploitation where a CVE applies (or an illustrative value in this sample), a CWE identifier and, where one exists, a CVE identifier. Severity bands follow the CVSS v3.1 qualitative scale. Business context can move the remediation order, but never the score itself.

SeverityCVSS v3.1 baseMeaningProposed closure target
Critical9.0 to 10.0Direct compromise or mass data exposure with little effort7 days
High7.0 to 8.9Serious weakness with a realistic path to harm15 days
Medium4.0 to 6.9Needs specific conditions or chaining30 days
Low0.1 to 3.9Hardening or limited impact90 days
Informational0.0Observation with no direct exploitable impactNext planned release
Reading EPSSEPSS is a probability between 0 and 1 that a vulnerability is exploited in the wild in the next 30 days. It helps to order work among findings of similar CVSS. Application-specific findings have no published EPSS, so values in this sample report are illustrative estimates and are labelled so.

4. Findings summary

Findings are ordered by CVSS v3.1 base score. Status reflects the position at the date of this report.

IDFindingPrimary assetCVSSSeverityEPSS*CWEStatus
F-01Account takeover through a predictable password-reset tokenCustomer Web Portal9.1Critical0.31CWE-640Open
F-04Stored cross-site scripting in the back-office support ticket viewerBack-office console7.6High0.07CWE-79Open
F-03No effective limit on one-time password (OTP) verification attemptsCustomer Web Portal and Mobile API7.4High0.09CWE-307Open
F-02Broken object-level authorisation on the loan statement APIMobile API7.1High0.18CWE-639Open
F-06Outdated JavaScript library with known vulnerabilities (jQuery 3.4.1)Customer Web Portal and DSA Portal6.1Medium0.02CWE-79Open
F-05Sessions remain valid after logout and idle timeout is too longCustomer Web Portal5.4Medium0.04CWE-613Open
F-07Legacy TLS protocol versions and weak cipher suites on the partner gatewayPartner gateway5.3Medium0.01CWE-326Open
F-08Verbose error messages and framework version disclosureMobile API3.7Low0.01CWE-209Open
F-09Missing clickjacking protection and HTTP Strict Transport SecurityDSA3.1Low0.01CWE-1021Open

* EPSS values are illustrative for this sample. CVSS vectors are given in each finding. Scores were calculated with the CVSS v3.1 equations published by FIRST.

Informational observations

IDObservation
I-01Permissive CORS policy on public static-asset endpoint
I-02Application log retention declared at 90 days on the web tier
I-03No published vulnerability disclosure contact

Distribution

1
Critical
3
High
3
Medium
2
Low
3
Informational

Distribution by OWASP Top 10 (2021) category

A01 Broken Access Control1
A02 Cryptographic Failures1
A03 Injection1
A05 Security Misconfiguration2
A06 Vulnerable Components1
A07 Identification and Authentication3

5. Detailed findings

Each finding lists description, affected assets, sanitized evidence, business impact, remediation and references. In a live engagement the full reproduction steps and screenshots form a confidential annex given to the Point of Contact only. In this sample, evidence is deliberately redacted and no working exploit code appears anywhere: values that would help to repeat an attack are replaced by [REDACTED] or described in words, the way a sanitized report for external circulation is prepared.

F-01

Account takeover through a predictable password-reset token

Critical
CVSS v3.1 base 9.1
Severity / score
Critical   9.1  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.31 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-640, CWE-330  |  Not applicable (application logic flaw)
OWASP mapping
A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures  |  WSTG-ATHN-09
Affected assets
Customer Web Portal, Mobile API (password-reset service)
Closure target
7 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

The password-reset service issues a one-time token to the registered mobile number or email address of the customer. During testing we found that the token is built from a small numeric space and from values that an observer can estimate (the time of the request and the account sequence). The service also accepts the token without binding it to the browser or device that requested it, and it does not invalidate earlier tokens when a new one is issued.

Taken together, these design choices mean that a person who knows only a customer's registered username can, with a modest number of attempts, obtain a working reset token and set a new password. No access to the customer's phone or inbox is required.

Evidence

Token sampling (sanitized)
Test accounts: 3 (owned by Virtual Caim, created for this engagement)
Reset requests issued per account: 60, spaced 2 to 5 seconds apart
Observation 1: token length is fixed at 8 numeric characters
Observation 2: [REDACTED] of 180 sampled tokens fell within a window narrower than the full keyspace, indicating non-uniform generation
Observation 3: a second request did not invalidate the first token (both remained valid until expiry)
Outcome: password of a Virtual Caim test account was changed without access to its registered phone or inbox
Technique and statistical findings are described at summary level. The generation analysis and the exact attempt budget are held in the confidential evidence annex handed over to the named Point of Contact only.

Business impact

An attacker can take over any customer account whose username is known or guessable, including accounts with active loans and linked bank mandates. This exposes personal and financial data, allows unauthorised changes to contact details and communication preferences, and may allow initiation of requests on behalf of the customer. Because the flaw can be automated, it scales across the whole customer base.

The event would qualify as unauthorised access to IT systems and data and as identity theft under the incident types listed in Annexure I of the CERT-In Directions dated 28 April 2022, and would trigger the 6 hour reporting duty. It would also raise questions under the security safeguards expected of a Data Fiduciary (DPDP Act, 2023, section 8(5)).

Recommended remediation

  1. Generate reset tokens with a cryptographically secure random generator, with at least 128 bits of entropy, and deliver them as a single-use link rather than a short numeric code.
  2. Bind each token to the originating session or device, expire it within 15 minutes and invalidate all earlier tokens on every new request.
  3. Apply per-account and per-source throttling on token requests and token submission, with alerting for sustained attempts.
  4. Send a notification to the registered contact on every successful reset, and force logout of all active sessions after the change.
  5. Add the reset flow to the regression suite so that a change to token handling cannot be released without review.

References

OWASP WSTG-ATHN-09 (Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities); OWASP Forgot Password Cheat Sheet; CWE-640; NIST SP 800-63B, section on look-up secrets and out-of-band authenticators.

F-02

Broken object-level authorisation on the loan statement API

High
CVSS v3.1 base 7.1
Severity / score
High   7.1  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.18 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-639, CWE-284  |  Not applicable (application logic flaw)
OWASP mapping
A01:2021 Broken Access Control; API1:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization  |  WSTG-ATHZ-04
Affected assets
Mobile API: /api/v2/loans/{id}/statements and /api/v2/loans/{id}/preferences
Closure target
15 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

The loan statement and preference endpoints accept a loan identifier in the request path. The service confirms that the caller is logged in but does not confirm that the loan belongs to the caller. A logged-in customer can therefore request statements, and change communication preferences, for loans belonging to other customers by changing the identifier.

Loan identifiers are sequential, which removes the practical barrier of guessing. The mobile application and the web portal share this API, so both are affected.

Evidence

Cross-account read (sanitized)
Caller: test customer A (session token [REDACTED])
Request : GET /api/v2/loans/[loan ID belonging to test customer B]/statements/2026-08
Result  : HTTP 200, statement for test customer B returned (name, address, EMI schedule, masked account number)
Control : same request without a session token returned HTTP 401, confirming authentication is enforced but ownership is not
Scope of testing: two Virtual Caim test customers only; no real customer record was requested
Only data of accounts created for the engagement was accessed. Identifiers in this extract are fictional.

Business impact

Any registered customer can read the loan statements and personal details of other customers and alter their communication preferences, which could be misused to suppress alerts before a fraud attempt. At the volume of a typical retail lending book, this is a reportable personal data breach scenario and a direct regulatory concern for an NBFC.

Recommended remediation

  1. Enforce ownership checks on the server for every object reference: derive the customer from the authenticated session and compare it to the owner of the requested loan before any data is returned or changed.
  2. Replace sequential identifiers with non-guessable identifiers as a defence in depth step. This is not a substitute for the ownership check.
  3. Centralise authorisation in a shared policy layer or middleware so that new endpoints inherit the check by default.
  4. Add automated authorisation tests (two users, cross-access attempts) to the CI pipeline for every API route that takes an object identifier.
  5. Log denied cross-account attempts and alert on repeated denials from one session.

References

OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) API1; OWASP WSTG-ATHZ-04 (Testing for Insecure Direct Object References); OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet; CWE-639.

F-03

No effective limit on one-time password (OTP) verification attempts

High
CVSS v3.1 base 7.4
Severity / score
High   7.4  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.09 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-307, CWE-799  |  Not applicable (application logic flaw)
OWASP mapping
A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures; API4:2023 Unrestricted Resource Consumption  |  WSTG-ATHN-03
Affected assets
Customer Web Portal and Mobile API (login OTP and transaction OTP verification)
Closure target
15 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

The OTP verification step for login and for sensitive profile changes accepts repeated incorrect values without locking the OTP, the account or the source. The six-digit code has a short validity, but within that window the number of attempts was not restricted by the service. The edge protection (WAF) applies a generic request-rate rule, but the rule is per IP address and was not triggered by a low, steady request rate.

Evidence

Attempt handling (sanitized)
Test account: Virtual Caim test customer 2
Attempts sent within a single OTP validity window: [REDACTED] (well above the limit expected by policy)
Responses: uniform HTTP 400 with a generic message; no lock-out, no CAPTCHA, no delay, no alert to the account holder
WAF behaviour: no block observed at the tested request rate
Environment note: test performed on the UAT stack with production-equivalent configuration, as agreed
The number of attempts and the timing profile are redacted in this sample.

Business impact

Where an attacker already holds the first factor (for example from a credential leak), the second factor can be defeated by repeated guessing. Weak OTP handling also undermines transaction authorisation for profile changes. Industry practice and regulator expectations on authentication for financial services are based on the second factor being a real barrier.

Recommended remediation

  1. Allow no more than 3 to 5 incorrect OTP submissions per issued OTP, then invalidate it and require a new one.
  2. Add progressive delay and temporary account lock after repeated failed verifications, with notification to the customer.
  3. Key rate limits on account and device as well as on IP address, so that distributed attempts are covered.
  4. Tune WAF rules for the authentication endpoints and forward the events to the monitoring platform with a dedicated alert.

References

OWASP WSTG-ATHN-03 (Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism); OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) API4; CWE-307.

F-04

Stored cross-site scripting in the back-office support ticket viewer

High
CVSS v3.1 base 7.6
Severity / score
High   7.6  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.07 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-79  |  Not applicable (application specific)
OWASP mapping
A03:2021 Injection  |  WSTG-INPV-02
Affected assets
Back-office console: Support > Tickets (subject and description fields, rendered in the officer view)
Closure target
15 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

Text submitted by a customer in a support ticket is stored and later displayed to the back-office officer in the console. The subject field is encoded correctly in the list view, but the ticket detail view renders part of the description as HTML without output encoding. Content with active markup therefore executes in the officer's browser, with the officer's privileges, when the ticket is opened.

The console sits on a different internal origin, so this is a cross-boundary flaw: input from the internet-facing portal affects a privileged internal session.

Evidence

Non-executing proof marker (sanitized)
Customer-side input : benign marker string containing HTML metacharacters [payload withheld]
Officer-side result : marker rendered as markup instead of text in the ticket detail view (confirmed in DOM inspection)
Execution context   : back-office console origin; session cookie flagged HttpOnly, so direct cookie theft not possible,
                      but actions in the officer's session (approve, reassign, export) are reachable from script
Test limits         : executed only against a test officer account; no data was read, changed or exported
Only a harmless marker was used. No working payload is reproduced in this report.

Business impact

A customer, or an attacker posing as one, can run actions inside an officer's authenticated session. Depending on the officer's role this may include viewing other customers' records, changing ticket status, or exporting data. The change of security scope (internet user to internal privileged session) is why the score is High despite the need for the officer to open the ticket.

Recommended remediation

  1. Apply context-aware output encoding to every field rendered in the console, using the framework's default escaping instead of raw HTML insertion.
  2. If rich text is a business requirement, sanitise with a maintained allow-list sanitiser on the server and render in a sandboxed container.
  3. Add a restrictive Content Security Policy to the console (no inline script, restricted sources) as a second layer.
  4. Review other places where customer-supplied text reaches the console (feedback forms, KYC remarks, chat transcripts) using the same test.

References

OWASP WSTG-INPV-02 (Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting); OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet; CWE-79.

F-05

Sessions remain valid after logout and idle timeout is too long

Medium
CVSS v3.1 base 5.4
Severity / score
Medium   5.4  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.04 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-613  |  Not applicable (application logic flaw)
OWASP mapping
A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures  |  WSTG-SESS-06, WSTG-SESS-07
Affected assets
Customer Web Portal
Closure target
30 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

Logging out of the portal removes the session cookie from the browser but does not invalidate the session on the server. A copy of the session identifier, if captured earlier, continues to work. The idle timeout is configured at 12 hours, and the absolute session lifetime is not enforced.

Evidence

Session lifecycle check (sanitized)
Step 1: log in as test customer; note session identifier (value redacted)
Step 2: perform Logout in the UI; browser cookie cleared
Step 3: replay a saved request with the old session identifier
Result: HTTP 200 and authenticated content returned; session still active 40 minutes after logout
Idle timeout observed: no expiry within 6 hours of inactivity (configuration review shows 12 hours)
Timing values are from the UAT stack.

Business impact

Customers using shared or public devices, and anyone whose session identifier is exposed through a log, proxy or malware, remain exposed after they believe they have signed out. The risk is moderate on its own, but it increases the impact of other findings (for example F-04).

Recommended remediation

  1. Invalidate the server-side session record on logout and on password change.
  2. Reduce idle timeout to 10 to 15 minutes for authenticated financial screens and set an absolute lifetime (for example 8 hours).
  3. Rotate the session identifier after login and privilege change.
  4. Confirm that session cookies carry Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite attributes on all environments.

References

OWASP WSTG-SESS-06 and SESS-07; OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet; CWE-613.

F-06

Outdated JavaScript library with known vulnerabilities (jQuery 3.4.1)

Medium
CVSS v3.1 base 6.1
Severity / score
Medium   6.1  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.02 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-79  |  CVE-2020-11022, CVE-2020-11023
OWASP mapping
A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components  |  WSTG-INFO-08
Affected assets
Customer Web Portal and DSA Portal (static script bundle)
Closure target
30 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

The front-end bundle includes jQuery version 3.4.1. Versions before 3.5.0 are affected by publicly documented cross-site scripting issues in HTML handling (CVE-2020-11022 and CVE-2020-11023). Identification was version-based. We reviewed the application code paths that pass data to the affected functions and found no confirmed reachable path in the tested release, so the practical exploitability is low today, but the component remains a latent risk for any future code change.

Evidence

Component identification (sanitized)
Asset   : portal static bundle, vendor script
Version : 3.4.1 (from file header and runtime version property)
Advisory: public CVE entries cited above; fixed in 3.5.0 and later
Code-path review: no confirmed reachable use of the affected functions with user-controlled input in the tested release
Score shown is the CVSS base score of the published advisory, adjusted to this context only where stated.

Business impact

If a developer later passes user-controlled content to the affected functions, the library will not protect the application. Unpatched third-party components are also flagged by most due-diligence questionnaires from regulators and partners.

Recommended remediation

  1. Upgrade jQuery to the current maintained release and run the front-end regression suite.
  2. Introduce software composition analysis in the build pipeline with a policy to fail the build on known high-severity advisories.
  3. Maintain an inventory of front-end libraries with owners and update intervals.

References

NVD entries for CVE-2020-11022 and CVE-2020-11023; jQuery 3.5.0 release notes; OWASP Top 10 (2021) A06.

F-07

Legacy TLS protocol versions and weak cipher suites on the partner gateway

Medium
CVSS v3.1 base 5.3
Severity / score
Medium   5.3  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.01 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-326, CWE-327  |  Not applicable (configuration weakness)
OWASP mapping
A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures  |  WSTG-CRYP-01
Affected assets
Partner gateway (external IP, redacted range 203.0.113.0/28, HTTPS service)
Closure target
30 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

The partner-facing HTTPS gateway still negotiates TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and offers cipher suites that use CBC mode with SHA-1 and 3DES. The portal and API hosts are configured correctly (TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only). The gateway appears to carry a legacy compatibility profile that was kept for older partner integrations.

Evidence

Protocol and cipher review (sanitized)
Service  : partner gateway, port 443
Enabled  : TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 (TLS 1.3 not offered)
Weak     : 3DES-based and SHA-1 CBC suites offered
Forward secrecy: available on TLS 1.2 suites, not enforced
Certificate: valid, 2048-bit RSA, chain complete
Scan output summarised. Host names are fictional.

Business impact

Exploiting legacy protocol weaknesses is difficult and needs a network position between the partner and the gateway, which is why the likelihood is limited. The finding still matters because PCI DSS, RBI expectations and most partner security reviews call for modern TLS, and because the traffic includes partner credentials and customer data.

Recommended remediation

  1. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1 and remove 3DES and SHA-1 CBC suites. Enable TLS 1.3.
  2. Agree a cut-off date with the partners that still use legacy clients, and publish the supported configuration.
  3. Add a TLS scan to the monthly external hygiene check and track results.

References

OWASP WSTG-CRYP-01; RFC 8996 (deprecating TLS 1.0 and 1.1); NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2; CWE-326.

F-08

Verbose error messages and framework version disclosure

Low
CVSS v3.1 base 3.7
Severity / score
Low   3.7  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.01 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-209, CWE-200  |  Not applicable (information exposure)
OWASP mapping
A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration  |  WSTG-ERRH-01, WSTG-INFO-02
Affected assets
Mobile API (malformed request handling), Customer Web Portal (HTTP response headers)
Closure target
90 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

Malformed input to two API routes returns a stack trace that names internal class paths and the framework version. HTTP response headers on the portal also disclose the web server and framework version. This helps an attacker to select known issues for the exact version, although it does not give access on its own.

Evidence

Error handling (sanitized)
Route    : POST /api/v2/support/feedback with malformed JSON body
Response : HTTP 500 with trace containing internal package names and framework version [REDACTED]
Header   : Server and X-Powered-By headers present on portal responses
Class names and versions are redacted in this sample.

Business impact

Low direct impact. It shortens the reconnaissance effort of an attacker and can make a later finding easier to exploit.

Recommended remediation

  1. Return a generic error body with a correlation identifier and log the details server-side.
  2. Remove or neutralise version-revealing headers at the web server and the reverse proxy.
  3. Set the framework to production mode for all internet-facing environments.

References

OWASP WSTG-ERRH-01; OWASP Error Handling Cheat Sheet; CWE-209.

F-09

Missing clickjacking protection and HTTP Strict Transport Security

Low
CVSS v3.1 base 3.1
Severity / score
Low   3.1  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
EPSS (illustrative)
0.01 probability of exploitation in 30 days (sample value)
CWE / CVE
CWE-1021, CWE-319  |  Not applicable (configuration weakness)
OWASP mapping
A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration  |  WSTG-CLNT-09, WSTG-CONF-07
Affected assets
DSA (agent) Portal
Closure target
90 days from notification (proposed, see section 9)

Description

The DSA portal can be loaded inside a frame on another origin because neither a frame-ancestors policy nor X-Frame-Options is returned. The portal also does not send the Strict-Transport-Security header, so a first visit over plain HTTP can be downgraded in a hostile network.

Evidence

Header review (sanitized)
Response headers on authenticated pages: Content-Security-Policy (frame-ancestors) absent, X-Frame-Options absent, Strict-Transport-Security absent
Frame test: portal login page rendered inside a frame on a Virtual Caim test origin
Test origin belongs to Virtual Caim.

Business impact

Low. A deceptive overlay could trick an agent into clicking on a hidden control, and a network attacker could downgrade a first connection. Both need user interaction and a favourable position.

Recommended remediation

  1. Send Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' (and X-Frame-Options: DENY for older browsers).
  2. Send Strict-Transport-Security with a max-age of at least 12 months and consider preload after verifying all subdomains.
  3. Add the headers at the reverse proxy so that every application inherits them.

References

OWASP WSTG-CLNT-09 and CONF-07; OWASP Secure Headers Project; CWE-1021.

6. Informational observations

These items do not carry a CVSS score. They are included for completeness and for regulatory alignment.

IDObservationDetail and recommendation
I-01Permissive CORS policy on public static-asset endpointNo sensitive data is served from the endpoint. Recommend restricting to known origins during the next release.
I-02Application log retention declared at 90 days on the web tierDeclared by the client and not independently verified. CERT-In Directions (28 April 2022), direction (iv), require logs of ICT systems to be kept for a rolling 180 days within Indian jurisdiction. Recommend aligning retention and confirming storage location.
I-03No published vulnerability disclosure contactRecommend a security.txt file and a monitored mailbox so that external researchers have a route to report issues.

Controls that held up under testing

AreaResult
SQL injectionNot found in 60 routes tested with parameterised input and manual probing
File uploadType and size enforcement effective; content stored outside web root
Back-office authenticationSecond factor enforced; no default credentials
Transport security (portal, API)TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only, strong suites, valid certificate chain
Cross-site request forgeryAnti-forgery tokens present on state-changing requests
Admin exposureNo administrative interface reachable from the internet

7. Risk matrix

The matrix places each finding by likelihood (how easy and how probable exploitation is, informed by EPSS and attacker effort) and impact (data, financial and regulatory consequence). It is a planning aid for management and sits alongside, not instead of, the CVSS score.

Likelihood / ImpactMinorModerateMajorSevere
Very likelyF-01
LikelyF-02, F-03
PossibleF-05, F-06F-04
UnlikelyF-08, F-09F-07

Reading the matrix

Attack path view

The three findings F-01, F-03 and F-05 form a realistic chain. An attacker who obtains a reset token (F-01) takes control of an account. If the customer later notices and logs out of an old session, that session can persist (F-05). Where a second factor is in place, F-03 weakens it. Closing F-01 and F-03 breaks the chain even before F-05 is fixed.

8. Remediation roadmap

The roadmap sequences work by risk and by dependency. Dates are counted from the issue of this report (21 October 2026).

WaveWindowItemsOutcomeSuggested owner
0. ContainDays 0 to 7F-01 (fix or temporary compensating control: disable self-service reset for high-value accounts, add throttling at WAF)Account takeover path closedEngineering lead, SOC
1. FixDays 8 to 15F-02, F-03, F-04Authorisation, OTP and console encoding correctedAPI team, back-office team
2. StrengthenDays 16 to 30F-05, F-06, F-07Session lifecycle, library upgrade, TLS profilePlatform and DevOps
3. HardenDays 31 to 90F-08, F-09, I-01 to I-03Error handling, headers, CORS, retention, disclosure contactPlatform, GRC
4. PreventQuarter afterAuthorisation test suite, SCA in CI, secure coding refresher, periodic re-testRoot causes addressed, fewer repeat findingsCISO, Engineering

Root-cause themes

Estimated effort (indicative)

ItemEngineering effortDependency
F-01 and F-036 to 10 person-daysProduct sign-off on reset journey
F-025 to 8 person-daysShared authorisation middleware
F-042 to 4 person-daysTemplate review
F-05 to F-096 to 9 person-daysRelease calendar, partner notice for TLS

9. Re-test and closure policy

A finding is closed only when it has been verified by the assessment team. The report is not treated as final until the follow-up verification is complete for the in-scope production system, and a limited-scope statement is issued if only staging was tested.

StepWhat happensWho
1. Fix notificationClient informs the Lead Auditor which findings are fixed, with the build version and hash.Client Point of Contact
2. Re-test windowTargeted re-test of each fixed finding and of closely related routes. Typically within 5 working days of the request.Virtual Caim
3. Outcome per findingClosed, Partially closed (with residual risk noted) or Open.Virtual Caim
4. Closure reportIssued with updated status, evidence and the tested build hash. A closure statement is signed by the Lead Auditor and the Head of the auditing organisation.Virtual Caim
5. Further roundsNumber of re-test rounds and chargeability are agreed in the engagement terms (sample: two included).Both
ValidityA report describes the state of security at the point in time of testing. Any significant change to code, infrastructure or configuration after the tested build calls for a new or delta assessment. For regulated entities, the frequency of VAPT is set by the board-approved policy and the applicable regulator.

Closure status template

IDReportedFix claimedRe-test dateStatusResidual risk
F-0121 Oct 2026--Open-
F-0221 Oct 2026--Open-
F-0321 Oct 2026--Open-
F-0421 Oct 2026--Open-
...

Annex A. Compliance mapping

This annex relates the findings to external requirements. It is a mapping for planning and is not a legal opinion or a certification.

A.1 CERT-In Directions, 28 April 2022 (section 70B(6), IT Act, 2000)

DirectionRequirement (summary)Relevance to this assessment
(i)Synchronise ICT system clocks with NIC or NPL NTP servers, or sources traceable to themTime source not in scope. Recommended check during log retention review (I-02).
(ii)Report listed cyber incidents to CERT-In within 6 hours of noticing them (Annexure I lists 20 incident types)F-01, F-02, F-04 describe conditions that would be reportable if exploited (unauthorised access, identity theft, data breach, attacks on applications).
(iii)Designate a Point of Contact to interface with CERT-InClient confirmed a designated Point of Contact exists (not independently verified).
(iv)Enable and maintain logs of all ICT systems for a rolling 180 days, within Indian jurisdictionI-02: declared 90 day retention on the web tier.

A.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A controls

ControlTitleFindings
A.5.15Access controlF-02
A.5.17Authentication informationF-01, F-03
A.8.3Information access restrictionF-02
A.8.5Secure authenticationF-01, F-03, F-05
A.8.8Management of technical vulnerabilitiesF-06, F-07
A.8.9Configuration managementF-07, F-08, F-09
A.8.15LoggingI-02
A.8.24Use of cryptographyF-07
A.8.26Application security requirementsF-01 to F-04
A.8.28Secure codingF-04, F-08
A.8.29Security testing in development and acceptanceAll (this assessment is evidence)

A.3 RBI expectations for regulated entities

SourceExpectation (summary)Relevance
RBI Master Direction on IT Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices (2023)Board-approved IT and cyber security policy, risk-based controls, periodic independent assurance including vulnerability assessment and penetration testing, and incident reporting to the regulatorThis assessment is a form of periodic assurance. Findings F-01 to F-04 should be tracked in the IT risk register with owners. Applicability depends on the entity's regulatory layer and should be confirmed by the client's compliance team.

A.4 Data protection

SourceProvisionRelevance
DPDP Act, 2023, section 8(5)Data Fiduciary to protect personal data with reasonable security safeguardsF-01, F-02, F-04 bear on this duty.
DPDP Act, 2023, section 8(6)Intimation of a personal data breach to the Data Protection Board and affected Data PrincipalsIncident response should cover the scenarios in F-01 and F-02.
DPDP Act, 2023, section 33 and ScheduleMonetary penalties after inquiry, with a ceiling of Rs 250 crore for failure to take reasonable security safeguardsShows the scale of exposure. Penalty is imposed by the Board after inquiry.
IT Act, 2000, section 43A and SPDI Rules, 2011Reasonable security practices for sensitive personal data, until the DPDP provisions replace them on commencementInterim relevance for current operations.

The DPDP Rules, 2025 were notified in November 2025 with phased commencement (most obligations, including security safeguards and breach intimation procedure, from May 2027). Clients should confirm the current commencement position before relying on a date.

Annex B. Test coverage and evidence register

B.1 Coverage by asset

AssetRoutes or hosts testedRoles usedManual hours (approx.)Findings
Customer Web Portal86 pages and flowsCustomer (2)78F-01, F-03, F-05, F-06, F-08
Mobile API340 routesCustomer (2)92F-02, F-03, F-08
DSA Portal41 pagesAgent (1)30F-06, F-09
Back-office console58 pagesOfficer (1)36F-04
Partner gateway3 hostsNone8F-07

B.2 Evidence register

RefTypeRelated findingHeld in
E-001Token sampling dataset (summary statistics)F-01Confidential annex
E-002Request and response pairs, redactedF-02Confidential annex
E-003Attempt log summaryF-03Confidential annex
E-004DOM inspection captureF-04Confidential annex
E-005Session lifecycle notesF-05Confidential annex
E-006TLS scan reportF-07Confidential annex
E-007Header captureF-08, F-09Confidential annex
Handling of audit dataRaw evidence is stored encrypted, shared only with the named Point of Contact, and disposed of on the date agreed in the engagement terms. Reports are sent from an official mailbox, password protected, with the password sent separately.

Annex C. Glossary

TermMeaning
APIApplication programming interface.
ASVSOWASP Application Security Verification Standard.
BOLABroken object-level authorisation: access to an object the user does not own.
CERT-InIndian Computer Emergency Response Team, under MeitY.
CIAConfidentiality, integrity, availability.
CORSCross-origin resource sharing.
CSPContent Security Policy, a browser-enforced allow-list for content sources.
CVECommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifier.
CVSSCommon Vulnerability Scoring System, version 3.1 used here.
CWECommon Weakness Enumeration.
DPDPDigital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
DSADirect selling agent.
EPSSExploit Prediction Scoring System.
HSTSHTTP Strict Transport Security.
IDORInsecure direct object reference, an older name for BOLA.
MFAMulti-factor authentication.
NBFCNon-banking financial company.
OTPOne-time password.
PoCPoint of Contact (also proof of concept, where stated).
PTESPenetration Testing Execution Standard.
SCASoftware composition analysis.
SPDISensitive personal data or information.
TLSTransport Layer Security.
UATUser acceptance testing environment.
VAPTVulnerability assessment and penetration testing.
WAFWeb application firewall.
WSTGOWASP Web Security Testing Guide.

CVSS v3.1 vector key

AV: attack vector (N network, A adjacent, L local, P physical). AC: attack complexity (L low, H high). PR: privileges required (N none, L low, H high). UI: user interaction (N none, R required). S: scope (U unchanged, C changed). C, I, A: impact on confidentiality, integrity, availability (H high, L low, N none).

Annex D. Sign-off

The report is signed by the auditors who performed the assessment, reviewed and signed by a designated reviewer who was not part of the test team, and authorised by the head of the auditing organisation. Signature blocks below are shown for format only; this is a sample and carries no signatures.

Auditor(s)
Name, ID, date (sample)
Independent reviewer
Name, designation, date (sample)
Head of auditing organisation
Name, designation, date (sample)
Fictional engagementExample Finserv Ltd., its systems, people, addresses, hosts, findings and scores are invented for illustration. Any resemblance to a real organisation is unintended. Virtual Caim prepares real reports on this structure for real clients, with scope, evidence and sign-off specific to the engagement.