VIRTUAL CAIM   SAMPLE REPORT - fictional engagement, sanitized
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VIRTUAL CAIM
Service datasheet and methodology brief

VAPT and
Offensive Security

How Virtual Caim plans, tests, reports and re-tests. Written for security heads, risk teams and procurement reviewers who want to see the working method, not just a list of services.
SAMPLE REPORT - fictional engagement, sanitized
Service
Vulnerability assessment and penetration testing (VAPT), red teaming, application and infrastructure security testing
Credentials
CERT-In empanelled auditing organisation. ISO 27001 certified.
Typical duration
1 to 3 weeks for most scopes, plus re-test
Report format
Agreed with you before testing starts (CERT-In guidance)
Contact
audit<at>virtualcaim.com | Corporate office: Ahmedabad

The sample finding in section 7 is fictional and sanitized. It shows the reporting depth, not any real client data.

Overview

A penetration test is only as useful as the report you can act on. We put as much care into the evidence, the business impact and the fix as into the testing itself.

Manual-led
Testing style
Scanners for breadth, people for depth
Safe
Exploitation
Proof of impact without damage
CVSS + EPSS
Scoring
Severity and likelihood, with CWE and CVE mapping
Re-test
Closure
Verified fixes and a closure statement

1. What we test

AreaTypical coverageCommon standards used
Web applicationsAuthentication, session, access control, input handling, business logic, file handling, client-side securityOWASP WSTG, OWASP ASVS, OWASP Top 10
Mobile applications (Android, iOS)Local storage, transport, binary protections, platform misuse, back-end API behaviourOWASP MASVS and MASTG
APIs (REST, SOAP, GraphQL)Object-level and function-level authorisation, authentication, resource limits, mass assignment, schema abuseOWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)
Internal and external networksHost and service discovery, misconfiguration, weak protocols, segmentation, Active Directory pathsPTES, NIST SP 800-115
Cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP)Identity and access, storage exposure, network paths, secrets, logging and guardrailsCIS Benchmarks, cloud provider security guidance
Wireless, IoT and OTEncryption and authentication, device interfaces, protocol handling, safe passive assessment for OTVendor and sector guidance, IEC 62443 concepts
Red team and social engineeringObjective-based adversary simulation, phishing exercises, physical and process tests (rules agreed in writing)MITRE ATT&CK for planning and reporting
Secure code review (optional)Targeted review of authentication, authorisation, crypto and data-handling code pathsOWASP Code Review Guide, ASVS

Test depth options

ModeWhat you shareBest for
Black boxOnly the target name or addressSeeing what an outsider can find
Grey boxTest accounts for each role, documentation, API specificationsMost application assessments: efficient, high coverage
White boxArchitecture, configuration, optionally source codeHigh-assurance systems and pre-release reviews

2. Methodology

Four phases, aligned with the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) and NIST SP 800-115, with the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide giving the checklist for web and API work.

1
Reconnaissance
Map the attack surface, roles, trust boundaries and technology stack.
2
Discovery
Manual testing by category, supported by tools for breadth.
3
Exploitation and post-exploitation
Prove realistic impact safely. Chain findings. No destructive actions.
4
Reporting
Rate, write, walk through, agree closure dates, plan re-test.
PhaseActivitiesWhat you receive
ReconnaissanceAsset and route inventory, role matrix, API specification review, technology fingerprinting, threat modelling notesAgreed test plan and asset list
DiscoveryOWASP WSTG categories: information gathering, configuration, identity, authentication, authorisation, session, input validation, error handling, cryptography, business logic, client side, APIImmediate notice of Critical and High findings as found
Exploitation and post-exploitationConfirm findings with safe proof. Assess reach: what data, which roles, what chain. Pivot analysis within agreed limitsValidated findings with evidence
Reporting and walkthroughCVSS v3.1, EPSS, CWE and CVE mapping, business impact, practical fixes, roadmapFinal report, evidence annex, walkthrough call

Principles we hold to

Where we differ from a scan-and-report vendorMost serious application flaws (broken access control, flawed authentication flows, business logic abuse) are not found by scanners. They are found by testers who understand the way your product is meant to work.

3. Engagement lifecycle

StageTypical timingWhat happensWhat we need from you
Scoping callDay 0Understand systems, user roles, environments, regulatory drivers, timelinesAsset list, environment details, previous reports if any
Proposal and planDay 1 to 3Fixed-scope quote, test plan, tool list, rules of engagement, report formatWritten approval, Point of Contact, NDA
Kick-offBefore testingConfirm windows, source IPs, test accounts, escalation numbersTest accounts per role, access paths, build version and hash
Testing1 to 3 weeksPhases 1 to 3, interim notice of serious findingsAccess to a technical contact for questions
Reporting3 to 5 working daysDraft report, factual review, final report, walkthroughFactual review within the agreed window
Re-testAfter your fixesTargeted verification, closure reportFix notification with build details

Indicative effort by scope

ScopeTypical effortNotes
Single web application, grey box5 to 10 person-daysDepends on roles, features and depth
Mobile app plus API8 to 15 person-daysBoth platforms add time
External network, up to 30 live hosts3 to 6 person-daysPlus follow-up on verified exposures
Internal network and Active Directory8 to 15 person-daysNeeds on-site or VPN access
Red team engagement4 to 8 weeks elapsedObjective based, defined rules

Figures are indicative planning ranges, not quotes. A fixed-scope quote follows a short consultation.

Test environment guidance

4. Deliverables

DeliverableAudienceContents
Executive summaryBoard, CEO, CISORisk posture in business terms, headline risks, what works well, where to start
Technical reportEngineering, security teamScope and assumptions, methodology, findings table, detailed findings, risk matrix, roadmap
Evidence annex (confidential)Named Point of ContactRedacted requests and responses, screenshots, scan outputs, reproduction notes
Compliance mapping annexGRC, audit, regulator-facing teamsFindings mapped to CERT-In Directions, ISO 27001:2022 controls, RBI and other expectations
Walkthrough sessionAll stakeholdersLive explanation of findings, Q and A, agreement of closure dates
Closure report and statementManagement, auditorsVerified status of each finding with tested build hash, signed by Lead Auditor and Head of the auditing organisation

Anatomy of the technical report

SectionWhat it answers
Document controlWhich version, which build, which environment, who has seen it
Executive summaryAre we safe enough to go live? What do we fix first?
Scope and rules of engagementWhat was tested, when, how, and what was not
MethodologyHow the testing was done and how findings are scored
Findings summaryOne table of every finding with CVSS, EPSS, CWE and status
Detailed findingsDescription, affected assets, sanitized evidence, business impact, remediation, references
Risk matrix and roadmapOrder of work, owners, effort and dependencies
Re-test policyHow and when closure is verified
AnnexesCompliance mapping, test coverage, evidence register, glossary, sign-off
Report integrityReports are signed by the auditors who did the work, reviewed and signed by an independent reviewer who is not part of the test team, and authorised by the head of the auditing organisation. They are delivered from an official mailbox through a password-protected or encrypted channel to your Point of Contact.

5. Severity model, re-test and closure

Each finding carries a CVSS v3.1 base score and vector, an EPSS likelihood of exploitation where available, and a CWE identifier. Where a CVE exists, it is quoted. Business context can change the order of remediation, but never the score.

SeverityCVSS v3.1MeaningProposed closure target
Critical9.0 to 10.0Direct compromise or mass data exposure with little effort7 days
High7.0 to 8.9Serious weakness with a realistic path to harm15 days
Medium4.0 to 6.9Needs conditions or chaining30 days
Low0.1 to 3.9Hardening or limited impact90 days
Informational0.0No direct exploitable impactNext planned release

Closure targets are proposals for planning; your policy and regulator decide the binding timelines.

Re-test and closure

  1. You tell us which findings are fixed, with the build version and hash.
  2. We re-test each fix and closely related routes, typically within 5 working days of the request.
  3. Each finding is marked Closed, Partially closed or Open, with the evidence.
  4. A closure report is issued. If only staging was re-tested, the report states that production was not tested.
  5. Re-test rounds included in the fee are written into the proposal.
Validity of a reportA report describes security at the time of testing. A significant change to code, infrastructure or configuration calls for a new or delta test. Frequency is set by your board-approved policy and your regulator.

6. Regulatory alignment

Our reports are structured so that they can be used as evidence for common expectations. Please confirm applicability and periodicity for your own regulatory category.

FrameworkWhere a VAPT report helps
CERT-In (IT Act section 70B, Directions of 28 April 2022, and the 2025 audit policy guidelines)Reports follow CERT-In auditor guidance: agreed format, named scope and environment, CVSS with EPSS, CWE and CVE mapping, closure timelines by severity, signed by declared personnel, secure delivery. Critical and High findings are notified during the audit, not only at the end.
RBI (IT governance, risk, controls and assurance practices)Evidence of periodic independent technical assurance for regulated entities, with findings suitable for the IT risk register
SEBI (Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework)Evidence of vulnerability and penetration testing for regulated entities, subject to the entity category
PCI DSS v4.0, requirement 11.4Penetration testing at least every 12 months and after significant change, internal and external
ISO/IEC 27001:2022Evidence for A.8.8 (technical vulnerabilities) and A.8.29 (security testing in development and acceptance)
DPDP Act, 2023Supports the Data Fiduciary duty to take reasonable security safeguards (section 8(5))

7. Sample finding excerpt

Fictional engagement, sanitized. One finding from the full sample report, shown as it appears to the client.

ID / title
F-02 Broken object-level authorisation on the loan statement API
Severity / score
High   7.1  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
CWE / OWASP
CWE-639 | API1:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization | WSTG-ATHZ-04
Affected asset
Mobile API: /api/v2/loans/{id}/statements (fictional)
Closure target
15 days

Description

The statement endpoint confirms that the caller is logged in but does not confirm that the loan belongs to the caller. A logged-in customer can request statements of other customers by changing the loan identifier, which is sequential.

Evidence (sanitized)

Caller  : test customer A (session token [REDACTED])
Request : GET /api/v2/loans/[loan ID of test customer B]/statements/2026-08
Result  : HTTP 200, statement for test customer B returned
Control : same request without session token returned HTTP 401
Only accounts created for the engagement were used. Identifiers are fictional.

Business impact

Any registered customer can read other customers' loan statements and personal details. At the scale of a retail lending book this is a reportable personal data breach scenario and a direct regulatory concern.

Remediation

  1. Derive the customer from the session and compare to the loan owner on the server before returning data.
  2. Use non-guessable identifiers as defence in depth.
  3. Centralise authorisation so that new endpoints inherit it by default, and add two-user tests to CI.

Findings summary table (excerpt)

IDFindingCVSSSeverityStatus
F-01Predictable password-reset token9.1CriticalOpen
F-02Broken object-level authorisation7.1HighOpen
F-06Outdated JavaScript library6.1MediumOpen
F-08Verbose error messages3.7LowOpen

8. Working with us

QuestionAnswer
Will testing disturb our systems?We test in agreed windows, from declared source addresses, with stop conditions. Destructive or denial-of-service tests are excluded unless you ask for them in writing.
Can you test production?Yes, with prior agreement. We recommend UAT for intrusive tests and non-intrusive checks on production.
How is the report delivered?From an official Virtual Caim mailbox to your named Point of Contact, encrypted or password protected, password sent separately.
What if a fix does not work?The re-test shows it as Partially closed or Open, with the reason. Re-test rounds in the fee are written into the proposal.
Can the report be used for regulators and auditors?Yes. The format is agreed with you before testing, and the compliance annex maps findings to common requirements.
Do you share our data with anyone?Audit reports and metadata are shared with CERT-In only where CERT-In guidance requires it, and we tell you before the assignment starts.
Next stepTell us your scope, systems and timelines. We reply with a fixed-scope quote and a test plan. Email audit<at>virtualcaim.com. Virtual Caim Private Limited, Corporate Office, Ahmedabad.

Sample datasheet. All sample findings are fictional. Standards named here belong to their respective owners (OWASP, FIRST, NIST, MITRE, PCI SSC, ISO/IEC).